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ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the transition in the US banking industry from
a community to a national logic, developing a general model to explain
how and when shifts in institutional logics occur. Based on qualitative
historical evidence and discrete-time event history analysis predicting the
introduction of legislation favoring the national logic, this chapter
proposes that dramatic exogenous events such as the Great Depression
or more gradual processes such as modernization favored the industry’s
transition to the national logic, but that such exogenous events had a
greater influence in areas where strategic actors could capitalize on them.
The qualitative evidence presented here suggests that struggles involving
organizational identity and ‘‘legitimacy politics’’ played an important role
in the shift in logics. Our theorizing focuses on how, when the environment
changes in an incremental fashion, actors are primed with new
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possibilities, which may shift their collective identities, but when
environmental changes are discontinuous, they provide actors strategic
opportunities to alter the balance of logics in the environment.
Institutional logics provide broad sets of beliefs and norms that shape
behavior, identities, practices and organizational forms in a given setting (see
e.g., Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, forthcoming). Those identities and
organizational forms can in turn become ‘‘carriers of institutional logics’’
(Thornton & Ocasio, 2008) that help perpetuate those logics. Although
single institutional logics may be dominant and stable in some settings, they
are always subject to reconfiguration. Research has documented how they can
significantly change – especially over an extended period of time. Shifts in
institutional logics can fundamentally reshape how organizations make
decisions andoperate (Lounsbury, 2002, 2007;Rao,Monin,&Durand, 2003);
for example, the transition from the community to the national logic in theUS
banking industry resulted in banks competing on scale and geographical
coverage and made it critical for banks to develop capabilities and structures
to manage geographically spread branches (Marquis & Huang, 2009, 2010).
Research has shown the impact of such transitions in settings as varied as
French cuisine (Rao et al., 2003), publishing (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999),
healthcare (Scott, Ruef, Mendel, & Caronna, 2000) and mutual funds
(Lounsbury, 2007). Thus, understanding shifts in the dominant logic of a field
is of great interest to organizational researchers.
Early studies of logic transitions, emphasizing the stability of institutional
logics, adopted an exogenous view of transitions in institutional logics;
that is, old logics are torn down and new logics are built up as a result of
dramatic events external to a field, such as political or legal changes
that mark transitions to new eras with different cultural, social, and
economic logics (Davis, Diekmann, & Tinsley, 1994; Davis & Thompson,
1994; Mizruchi, Stearns, & Marquis, 2006; Useem, 1993; Zajac & Westphal,
2004). Recent studies have begun adopting an endogenous view of transition
in logics, viewing environments as more fragmented and contested than
previously thought. In this view, actors’ competition over logics drives
transitions in logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Marquis & Lounsbury,
2007; Rao et al., 2003). In this chapter, we focus on how these two views
on logic shifts, each examined in isolation, are inherently incomplete.
The exogenous view, while underscoring the impact of dramatic events as
shocks to existing systems, may overemphasize their impact, potentially
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underestimating the role of logic-based competition and so fail to explain
why there is variation in the impact of such shocks in different regions. By
contrast, the endogenous view has yet to adequately explain how transitions
in logics initially begin, when incumbents still enjoy absolute dominance
over challengers, and how those transitions accelerate at specific points of
time.
In this chapter, we track the transition in the U.S. banking industry’s
institutional logic from a community to a national logic by taking into
account both endogenous processes of competition resulting from actors
actively defending logics that provide them with identities and benefits, and
exogenous changes that shape opportunities for actors to gain dominance
in competition for logics. In essence, the model presented is interactive.
We argue that exogenous events mainly represent forks in the road.
Which institutional path a field takes is frequently a result of competition
between actors espousing different institutional logics when they respond
to opportunities created by the exogenous events. We suggest that the
interaction of exogenous and endogenous forces is likely to lead to an
extended period of debate and contestation over the appropriate way to
organize field activities, rather than to sudden shifts in logics, as previous
studies often depicted. In this model, in contrast to traditional work on
institutional logics, exogenous forces have an impact mainly as strategic
opportunities to radically alter the balance of logics. We argue that there is
no shortage of exogenous forces in play, and identifying which are
responsible for occasioning transitions requires consideration of the extant
actors in the institutional field. The theory proposed here is that when the
external environment is changing in an incremental fashion, actors are
primed with new possibilities, which may shift their collective identities
(Thornton & Ocasio, 2008), and thus they affect the degree to which actors
identify with previously embraced logics; but when environmental changes
are discontinuous, they provide strategic opportunities for existing powerful
actors to alter the balance of logics in the environment.
Historical research on the US banking industry has documented sustained
debate and competition between two distinct organizing logics: a community-
oriented logic focused on the advantages of locally owned and operated
banks, and a nationally oriented logic focused on the efficiencies to be
realized from geographic diversification of banking assets (Marquis &
Lounsbury, 2007). This tension reflects a deeper division in US history and
society that dates to the founding of the United States and debates between
Jefferson and Hamilton over the respective merits of centralized and
decentralized economic and political structures. In light of prior work that
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has concluded that organizational forms reflect the ‘‘master principles
of society’’ (Haveman & Rao, 1997, p. 1614), the case of US banking is
theoretically interesting because it illustrates the two deeply rooted, yet
competing master principles of social organization as well as conflict between
the different organizational forms that embody those logics. The main
argument and the eventual finding of this chapter is that the banking
industry’s shift from a community to a national logic was assisted by
modernization and by a dramatic historical event, the Great Depression, but
their effects were contingent on the presence of strategic actors who identified
with and sought to capitalize on the national logic.
The degree to which an institutional logic is dominant can be gauged by
whether it is codified in laws and regulations (e.g., Dobbin, 1994), which are
often ‘‘endogenous’’ (Kraatz & Block, 2008) and which in turn reinforce the
taken for granted nature of the logics (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The
community logic is reflected by restrictive laws that prohibit banks
from establishing geographically dispersed branches so that banks tend to
focus on serving local communities where they are located, whereas the
national logic is reflected by liberal laws that allow banks to branch out
geographically to gain benefits from the economy of scale and scope by
standardizing practices across branches. We thus examine the passage of
liberal branching laws in 50 US states over the twentieth century as the
results of the two types of exogenous change, the presence of unit vs.
branch banks, and their interaction effects. For reasons we discuss later, we
specifically focus on the period up until 1978. The period 1896–1978 saw 41
instances of states relaxing geographic restrictions thus reflecting the
nationally oriented logic.
Our theoretical understanding of this process is grounded in an exploratory
study of meeting minutes from national, regional, and state banking
associations (see appendix) and in hypotheses tested on an annual time-series
dataset of changes in US state laws that extends from 1896–1978. Numerous
theorists have argued that a challenge to deep understanding of institutional
change is lack of fine-grained historical detail and extended time sequences
(Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Leblebici & Shah, 2004). These authors recommend
that organizational theory must conduct more historical research to remedy
this issue. The transcribed minutes at those associations’ meetings reflect the
bankers’ identification with two distinct organizational identities in conflict,
divided along the lines of community and national logics; those minutes
also reflect ‘‘legitimacy politics’’ (Stryker, 2000), contestation that led to the
gradual domination of the national over the community logic, as reflected in
specific legal changes. The shift from community to national logic was the
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result of modernizing economic and technical conditions which created
new opportunities for banks to expand, and which incentivized a shift in
bankers’ identities. To assess the interactive effect of identities and external
environments which led to tipping the balance in favor of a national logic,
we conduct event history analyses of the passage of state laws in the
48 contiguous US states between 1896, approximately when the debate began,
and 1978, the year that we suggest below marks the transition to the next
phase.
Our primary theoretical contribution is to study the process of historical
change in institutional logics, particularly as they are represented in
actor identities. More specifically, given the logic examined (in the particular
context of the banking industry), this chapter contributes to the under-
standing of the ‘‘loss of community’’ in society, a theme that has interested
many early sociologists (To¨nnies, 1887; Weber, 1978[1968]), and a few
recent economists (e.g., Marglin, 2008). We suggest that because institu-
tional logics are intimately related to actors’ identities (Rao et al., 2003),
they are less passive than typically conceptualized and actors engage in
strategic action to defend and promote their worldviews (Marquis &
Lounsbury, 2007). Regarding the external changes that are so essential to
institutional explanations, we argue that these have the effects they do as a
result of opening opportunities for these actors; gradual changes, such as the
processes of modernization, prime actors with new possibilities and thus lead
to a shift in identities, and discontinuous changes such as the Depression
allow one group of actors to take precedence over another.
We conclude that although historical periods might have relatively
punctuated boundaries, shifts between them are more a culmination of
prior events than simply a result of a few dramatic exogenous shocks.
Our exploratory historical investigations suggest that one reason for the
extensive back-and-forth between the opposing logics at the state level, and
for the relatively long time it took for one logic to gain dominance, was
the presence of countervailing environmental forces, and actors that
supported both sides. Thus, the theoretical perspective offered by this
chapter also suggests that transitions in logics are not necessarily
irreversible. Other exogenous shocks such as the financial crisis of 2008
could reconfigure the balance of logics in favor of the community logic, such
that interested actors could capitalize on those opportunities. Given that the
community logic in the US banking industry has persisted and that it even
still thrives in some settings (Almandoz, 2010; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007),
we believe that a similar phenomenon as the one described here, but in
reverse, could happen again.
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COMPETING LOGICS AND THE STRUCTURE OF
THE US BANKING INDUSTRY
There have been two alternative logics to organize banking operations in the
U.S. the community logic and the national logic. The community logic
emphasizes that banks focus on serving local communities and to do so often
requires banks to deeply embed themselves in local communities by
developing close relationships to local patrons. As a result, banks following
this logic often do not branch out of the local communities they serve. They
are single-unit banks. The national logic emphasizes that banks are able to
gain benefits from scale and scope through geographical diversification.
Banks following this logic often establish branches in different locations
and standardize operation across branches instead of customizing their
services to local communities. Community and national logics are therefore
‘‘incarnated’’ in particular organizational forms (Greenwood & Suddaby,
2006; Haveman & Rao, 1997).
The distinction between these two alternative logics can be traced to the core
philosophical positionsof the twomajor politicalpartiespresent at the founding
of the United States. The Republicans, led by Thomas Jefferson, preferred
decentralized political and economic systems with community-oriented control
ofbanks; themajoropposingparty, theFederalists, ledbyAlexanderHamilton,
preferred centralized political and economic systems with large, multiple-
branch, national banks. Friedland and Alford (1991, p. 246) note that ‘‘the
persistent tendency for Americans to construct decentralized state structures,
to separate governmental power, to prevent the emergence of national
banksyderives in part from a culturally contingent concept of power,
embedded inanotionof libertyderived fromtheoriginal settlers’ experienceof a
highly intrusive English state.’’
The conflict over community versus national logics in social life in
general, and in the banking industry in particular, has been repeatedly
described throughout the US history. Tocqueville ([1835]2000), for example,
during his extended trip to the United States in 1831 and 1832, maintained
that the vibrant community life in the United States served as an antidote to
centralized state and economic powers. The principle of community
sovereignty was shown by Dobbin (1994) to be essential in understanding
US economic and political behavior in the nineteenth century. Friedland
and Alford’s (1991) observation that conflict has been a particularly salient
feature of US banking is reflected in Andrew Jackson’s 1830s veto of the
charter of the Second Bank of the United States, an early branch bank.
CHRISTOPHER MARQUIS ET AL.182
Do
wn
loa
de
d b
y C
orn
ell
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
 A
t 1
9:2
7 0
1 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
6 (
PT
)
Stated Jackson: ‘‘It is easy to conceive that great evils to our country and its
institutions might flow from such a concentration of power of a few men
irresponsible to the people’’ (quoted in Roe, 1994, p. 58). Resistance to the
nationally oriented logic, albeit marginalized, persists to this day in the US
banking industry (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007), as evidenced by the
rhetoric against Wall Street banks following the 2008 crisis (see for instance
moveyourmoneyproject.org, the website of a campaign encouraging people
to move their capital away from Wall Street).
Such a conflict played out in legislative change when actors espousing
either logic sought to influence state regulations to advocate their beliefs as
well as defend their interests. The industry hosted opposing groups of actors
with dramatically different identities and hence visions of how to organize
US economic life. As Friedland and Alford (1991) theorize, these visions
were central and durable features of organizational identities. The particular
legislative battles revolved around whether banks would be allowed to
establish geographically dispersed branches or not, echoing the distinction
between the two logics of organizing bank operations.
Fig. 1 illustrates for the entire twentieth century the extent to which banks
were legally prohibited from establishing branch locations. As shown, during
this approximately 100-year period, the US banking industry underwent a
fundamental shift in organizing logic as manifested in the erosion of the
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Fig. 1. Percentage of US States Prohibiting Bank Branching, 1896–2001.
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community logic and conversely the rise of the national logic. At the turn of
the twentieth century, about 60 percent of US states had laws that explicitly
prohibited branching. Across more than 12,000 commercial banking firms in
1900, only 119 had branches. But by the early 1990s, with no US states still
prohibiting branching, the approximately 12,000 separate banking organiza-
tions extant at that point had more than 80,000 bank branches.
What is not as apparent from looking at this figure, with its three
apparently stable eras and two sharp periods of transition, is that during this
entire period, there were many offsetting changes. In 1968, for example,
Florida liberalized and Montana restricted local banking laws. Although the
graph shows a general erosion of the community-oriented logic, on a year-
to-year basis, a battle between the competing logics was played out at
the US state level within industry trade associations and, ultimately, in
the offices of legislators and state legislatures by organizational actors
working to align state regulations with their respective logics. This process
of continual opposition by two deeply entrenched banking logics and
identities across the US states is congruent with similar struggles in other
settings. Research evidence suggests that legislative changes assumed to
have manifested and precipitated shifts in logics (see, e.g., Davis et al., 1994;
Fligstein, 1990) were not easily settled affairs. The figure further shows, also
consistent with traditional work on institutional logics, that the transition
between periods appears to be discontinuous and to correspond to periods
of major federal regulatory shifts, be they responses to the Great Depression
or the deregulatory fervor that began in the late 1970s. Thus, we explore
below how shifts in logics as manifested in legislative change occur as a
result of opposing actors competing to advocate different logics in the
opportunity structure shaped by exogenous changes.
Competing Logics, Organizational Identities, and Institutional Change
Logics are more than passive belief systems, as often conceptualized.
‘‘[L]ogics constitute the identities of actors’’ (Rao et al., 2003, p. 796);
they are critical components of the identity of organizations, of ‘‘that
which is central, distinctive, and enduring’’ about organizations (Albert &
Whetten, 1985), and as such logics are often purposefully adopted, sometimes
passionately embraced, by organizations and individuals. For example, classic
cuisine and Novelle cuisine follow different logics that define different role
identities for chefs consciously and passionately embraced by them (Rao
et al., 2003).
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In the case of the US banking industry, according to the community logic,
banks are and should be ‘‘owned in the community and operated for the
profit of the stockholders and for the benefit and development of the
community in which it existsyThe unit bank is the heart of the community
and furnishes the circulation of the life blood of business’’ (National
Association of Supervisors of State Banks Convention, 1934, p. 90). By
contrast, according to the national logic, banks are and should be expansive
systems with standardized branch operation across different geographical
locations and thus represent modernization and economic efficiency.
Defending the national logic incarnated in multibranch banks, William B.
Ridgely, comptroller of the currency, stated at meetings of the American
Bankers Association: ‘‘I believe in branch banking. Theoretically, it is the
best system, as it is more economical, more efficient, will serve its customers
better, and the organization can be such as to secure in most respects better
management’’ (American Bankers Association, 1902, p. 72). Thus, the
identities of banks organized according to the community and the national
logic are deeply felt and in sharp opposition to each other.
When actors identify themselves with an institutional logic, they claim the
identity provided by the logic. Internalized identity entails ‘‘valuation
orders’’ (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, p. 805) that can generate principled
adherence to established logics. Logics provide desirable images that can be
used by strategic actors to craft organizational identities and derive
stakeholder support (Scott & Lane, 2000). In the context of community
banking, it becomes evident that logics provided desired images, which
helped banks define what was ‘‘special, unique, or distinctive about [their]
organizations to relevant audiences’’ as well as what their ‘‘core values’’ and
‘‘central beliefs’’ were (Scott & Lane, 2000). To defend their world view, unit
banks framed the debate as one of community banking versus consolidated
capital. The community-oriented identity and logic were firmly based in the
advantages of decentralized economic systems and the sacrosanct connec-
tion between depositors and bank directors that would be broken by
branching giving rise to an industry dominated by large, impersonal
institutions (Chapman & Westerfield, 1942; Fischer, 1968). This was the
thrust of remarks by Charles G. Dawes, president of Chicago’s Central
Trust Company of Illinois, who insisted: ‘‘It is folly to maintain that an
agent of a branch bank, acting at a distance under delegated authority, can
exercise the same discretion and have the same latitude in the making of
loans in which the personal equation is an element as does the local bank
acquainted with local conditions and authorized to cope with a local
situation’’ (American Bankers Association, 1902, p. 117).
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Hence, although the unit banks controlled only a small percentage
of overall industry assets, the community identity of these firms was
quite resonant with and thus often gained the support of the public and
politicians. The strength of such sentiments is reflected in a mid-1930s
survey that found 90 percent of Nebraska unit bankers opposing branching
(Kuhn, 1968). A 1924 Illinois referendum rejecting branching by a large
majority (White, 1984), with opposition greatest in areas with a significant
unit bank presence, is evidence of strategic action on behalf of these banks.
Newspaper accounts and other historical records of the time that
documented unit bankers’ severe public critiques of branching legislation
suggest that the public was influenced by the unit banks’ strategic rhetoric.
Finally, formal resolutions issued in 1923 declaring the Kansas, Missouri,
and Pennsylvania bankers’ trade associations to be opposed to branch
banking are evidence that unit bankers were able to translate their logic and
power into political positions.
Although unit bankers defined their identity in terms of desirable
community images and negatively framed their opponents as consolidated
financial power, by contrast, large, urban, and branch banks expressed their
own identity in terms of a nationally oriented logic drawing on images of
modernization, economic efficiency, and safety, which were assumed to
be greater as banks grew in size and geographic scope. In strategically
defending their identity, multi-unit banks argued that modernization and
economic efficiency was on their side and that banks with branches, because
they spread credit risk across multiple geographies, were safer (Collis, 1926;
Fischer, 1968). A. P. Giannini of the Bank of Italy (later Bank of America),
who spent months at a time touring the country in his Cadillac to rally
support for the expansion of branching, was emblematic of the strategic
actors who devoted considerable time and energy to mobilizing support for
branch banking (James & James, 1954).
Such identity-based competition over logics was directed to change state
regulation over bank branching. Our historical investigation suggests that
organized trade associations, frequently seen by researchers as mobilizing
structures (Ingram & Rao, 2004), linked competing groups with divergent
identities to changes in legislation. A unique feature of banking is that state
affiliations were important to both types of banks (i.e., unit and branching
banks), which led both groups to belong to the same state banking
associations. This was the case both because banks were incorporated in and
thus naturally identified themselves with their home states and because these
associations provided necessary services (e.g., pooled burglary protection
and insurance).1 These associations were essential to the advancement of
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bankers’ world views by providing an infrastructure for influencing opinions
and a connection to lawmakers. As such, in the annual budgets of almost all
these associations, the largest line item was associated with the ‘‘legislative
committee,’’ the group that constituted the liaison with state governments
and activists. These associations engaged in a wide variety of activities to
influence opinions.2 For example, it was recorded in an annual proceedings
of the American Bankers Association (1912) that one such committee ‘‘has
devoted much time and attention to the various measures by personal
attendance of a number of its members at Washington on different
occasions, by mail and by telegraph, and has enlisted the active support and
co-operation of Clearing House Associations, States Bankers Associations
and other organizations and individuals along lines of procedure mapped
out by the Committee’’ (p. 237).
Due to the instrumental role of state bank associations, opposing
constituencies within the banking industry worked within these existing
associations to have them adopt and endorse positions consistent with their
respective identities and logics. Trade associations were often forced to take
firm positions on issues instead of straddling so that they represented just
one position when influencing legislation. Recall, for example, that in 1923 a
number of associations declared themselves opposed to branching. Thus,
through debating and then voting within the associations, banks supporting
opposing logics labored to influence the position that bank associations
took. Many years’ proceedings record members’ votes on the respective
sides of debates aimed at focusing the associations’ position. Although
banks’ financial size might be presumed to exert more influence than other
factors on voting results, examinations of meeting minutes and other
historical work (Calomiris, 1993) suggest that their larger numbers lent
single-unit banks considerable leverage. The connection between voting and
advocacy is in evidence in New Jersey in 1915; the state bank association
‘‘determined to use every endeavor to prevent the extension of branch
banking’’ (New Jersey Bankers Association, 1915, p. 91) after voting was
taken and the majority of the members opposed the expansion of branching
laws. There was typically substantial debate over these issues and often a
relatively small margin tipped the balance, as was the case in New York in
1934 when the association’s advocacy was determined by vote of 198
opposed to 135 in favor of a branch banking measure.
To sum up, the preceding theorizing based on extensive historical
evidence suggests that banks supporting the opposing logics of organizing
bank operations competed to influence state legislators to pass more
restrictive or more liberal branching laws. And state bank association
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endorsement constituted a key path to legislative change to the extent that
state bank associations represented banks in dealing with state legislators.
As such, competition over logics among banks first played out in state bank
associations when banks debated and voted to determine the position taken
by state bank associations when influencing state legislation. Consistent
with Greenwood and Suddaby’s (2006) argument that organizational form
is a key representation of institutional logics, and Haveman and Rao’s
(1997) conclusion (p. 1645) that organizational forms are ‘‘incarnations of
logics,’’ we hypothesize that the relative presence of carriers of various logics
led to policy changes consistent with the underlying institutional logics of
those banks.
Hypothesis 1. The greater the relative presence in a state of actors with a
nationally oriented banking logic (i.e., multi-unit banks), the more likely
that the state will pass liberal branching legislation.
Exogenous Changes and Opportunities for Institutional Transitions
Exogenous changes no doubt impinge on the existing institutional system.
For example, research on institutional change traditionally considers
external changes (typically either legal or economic) as shocks to the
existing institutional system which consequently create shifts in institutional
logics (e.g., Haveman & Rao, 1997). Similarly, in the context of US banking,
Fig. 1 shows that coinciding with the Great Depression there is a drastic
drop in the percentage of US states with restrictive bank branching laws,
seeming to suggest the punctuating effect of exogenous shocks. However,
we suggest that the effect of exogenous changes on institutional logics may
be more subtle than just automatically creating ‘‘shifts’’ in logics. To
understand such subtleties requires insights into how actors support
different institutional logics and how different identities react to exogenous
changes in ways that shape competition over logics.
We suggest that actors’ reactions may vary with whether exogenous
changes are discontinuous or gradual. Discontinuous changes may suddenly
create enormous uncertainty which strategic actors can leverage as an
opportunity to alter their balance of power with respect to their opponents.
Gradual changes unfold over time so their influence may progressively
penetrate social actors leading them to spontaneously change their beliefs
and identity as adaptive responses (Gioia, Schultz, & Corley, 2000; Rao,
Monin, & Durand, 2005). Hence, strategic actors’ reactions to gradual
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exogenous changes may be less contentious and conflict-ridden than
those due to discontinuous exogenous changes, even if perhaps they lead
to dramatic long-term effects. Such consideration suggests that there is not
only a primary effect of exogenous changes on institutional shifts but also a
secondary effect contingent on strategic actors’ reactions. In the context of
the US banking industry, we specifically examine the impact of the Great
Depression as a discontinuous exogenous change and of modernization as
having a gradual effect on the passage of liberal branching laws in US
states. Given the difficulty in capturing the subtlety in actors’ reactions
to exogenous changes, we extensively draw on historical materials for
illustration and to supplement our quantitative analysis.
The Great Depression and the Passage of Liberal Bank Branching Laws
Discontinuous changes typically lead to an era of ferment characterized by
uncertainty, where there is competition between organizing logics and
opportunities for new solutions (Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1992). Barley and
Tolbert (1997, p. 102) theorized that ‘‘changes in technology, cross-cultural
contacts, economic downturns and similar events increase the odds that
actors can (or must) modify an institution.’’ Thus, periods of dramatic
changes provide opportunities for actors to shape the broader institutional
system according to their own logics and interests. Although much prior
work on discontinuous change has focused on the evolution of technology,
there are reasons to believe that these arguments apply to political changes
as well. Greenwood and Hinings (1996, p. 1043), for example, suggest a
model whereby ‘‘performance problems and crises act to trigger
political dissensus over existing arrangements and permit groups less
committed to prevailing practices to more legitimately raise and promote
alternative perspectives.’’ Thus, in some cases, new opportunities arise in the
political system. Opportunities on which strategic actors can capitalize
(Tarrow, 1998). Barley and Tolbert (1997, p. 102) stress the importance of
these openings since under usual circumstances, ‘‘change is likely to be
constrained by the intransigence of others who, in lieu disturbance in
the status quo, are likely to resist reopening previously negotiated
arrangements.’’
This seems to be the case in the US banking industry. The historical
meeting minutes suggest that the perceptions of the public and legislators
were dramatically affected by the Great Depression, but that how they
interpreted this drastic event was not straightforward. Not surprisingly,
divergent interpretations emerged from actors with competing logics and
identities (Lok, 2010). The legislation spawned by the Depression followed
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considerable debate, particularly over questions of how to interpret the
banking troubles in light of the question of bank expansion.
Nationally oriented bankers emphasized the disproportionate number of
unit banks that had failed. To counterattack, unit bankers, pointing to the
considerable number of branch banks that had failed as well, suggested that
the underlying problem had to do with bank chartering procedures instead
of any particular organizational form. Further, unit bankers argued that
failures of unit banks were limited to a few states, which suggested that there
were underlying conditions of the state that led to the problems, not unit
banking per se. There were legislative trade-offs. Even as community-
oriented bankers succeeded in blocking an early provision in the Glass-
Steagall Act that would have permitted national branching, nationally
oriented actors were ‘‘taking advantage of the Depression hysteria to
conclude in their favor the battle that has been going on for a number of
yearsy It is a fight,’’ the record continues
between the unit bankery and the proponentsy of branch bankingyThose who are
using the propaganda that the unit country bank has been a failure are putting forward
the remedy of ‘‘Safety in Bigness’’; that is, the safety of the foreign system of nation-wide
branch banking. Their argument is based upon an absolutely false position. They say
that the unit country bank has been a failure, and that the large number of failures
among the smaller banksymakes it necessary to change.’’ (American Bankers
Association, 1933, pp. 14–16)
Other documents at the time and later suggest that, although in fact small
bank failures were isolated, the accepted wisdom came to be that small bank
failures had contributed to the Depression (e.g., Calomiris, 1993), par-
ticularly through the publicity generated by agents of the national logic, who
sought the enactment of branch banking laws.3
Thus, historical evidence suggests that the Great Depression influenced
the passage of liberal bank branching laws in US states in two ways. First,
the massive economic crash and consequent federal legislative changes
likely affected all states. Second, the Great Depression’s influence at least
partly depended on debate between, and propaganda of actors espousing,
different logics about the most adequate causal interpretation of the Great
Depression. Although the general belief was that unit banks contributed to
the Great Depression as noted earlier, such a belief might be stronger where
proportionally there were more branching banks compared to unit banks. In
those states, branching banks were likely to have more weight in the
interpretation of the cause of the Great Depression, leading to more liberal
branching laws. We thus suggest both the direct and the interactive effect of
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the Great Depression on the passage of liberal bank branching laws in US
states.
Hypothesis 2a. The Great Depression led states to be more likely to pass
liberal bank branching legislation.
Hypothesis 2b. The effect of the Great Depression was heightened in
states with more actors with a nationally oriented banking logic (i.e.,
multi-unit banks).
Modernization and the Passage of Liberal Bank Branching Laws
Modernization was an important change that had deep impact on almost
every aspect of the US society. For example, its impact on organizations is
recounted by Haveman and Rao’s (1997) study of how modernization
gave rise to a new form of mutual savings organizations. Of particular
importance for the US banking industry are two modernization processes,
i.e., urbanization and the development of transportation technology
(Marquis & Huang, 2009, 2010). Through urbanization, cities grew bigger
and customers became increasingly sophisticated and demanding, which
created new challenges for banks. One particular challenge related to
branching was how banks could maintain their business relationships with
their customers when these customers increasingly moved to suburban areas
with the growth of cities. Consider the history of Michigan-based Comerica
Bank (Comerica Bank, 1999, p. 31): ‘‘When most Detroiters still lived
around the downtown area, one office served the bank well. As the
population moved to the edges of the core city and beyond, banks, like other
retailers, had to follow if they wished to remain competitive in serving
customers.’’ To respond to this challenge, banks often need to establish
branches close to their customers who lived in much bigger urban areas.
Various histories of banking suggest that the growth of cities stimulated
banks’ establishment of branches (Collis, 1926; Fischer, 1968).
The development of transportation technology created new opportunities
for banks to serve geographically dispersed customers through branching by
overcoming constraints from doing so. Banks faced two particular
constraints from branching out to dispersed geographical areas. First,
banks that created outlying branches became dependent, owing to agency
issues, on physical communication. Chapman and Westerfield’s (1942)
exposition of the management of bank branches describes a range of paper
systems banks used to monitor branch activities, among them, duplicate
records, daily reports, and documentation of personnel, financial
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statements, and other information on business conditions, all of which had
to be transported between the branches and headquarters. Second, to
effectively manage multibranch banks requires the close inspection of
branches by headquarters personnel. Branch locations were monitored by
traveling staffs of auditors similar to the ‘‘inspectors’’ or ‘‘road men’’ who
administered geographically dispersed chain stores (Chandler, 1977). White
(1984) notes a shift in branching activity during the 1920s as agency issues
began to be addressed as a result of improvements in transportation that
facilitated travel.
Haveman and Rao (1997) describe how modernization altered consumers’
support of traditional forms of mutual savings organizations leading to
traditional dying organizations being replaced by new organizations that
embodied the new logic. The historical materials we consulted, however,
suggest that the process was not so much one of organizational selection and
replacement as of changes in the external environment priming shifts to new
identities promoted by existing actors. As the country modernized in the
twentieth century, some unit banks, as they gained a new understanding of
what was possible, shifted their views and identities accordingly (Gioia
et al., 2000). Similar to the identity migration processes shown by Rao,
Davis, and Ward (2000), branch banking became more accepted and
desirable as states become more urbanized, and transportation develop-
ments allowed suburbanization.
The link between changing environments and the need for compensating
adjustments in the regulation of banking was evident in an address by the
president of National Capital Bank of Washington at a meeting of the
American Institute of Banking.
Five or six years ago it became evident that the power of the national banking system was
not increasing in proportion to the development of industry or commercey [B]ranch
banking is not a problem in the smaller cities of the country, but it is a very acute problem
in the larger cities, where the population is shifting rapidly and new business areas are
springing up. (American Institute of Banking (AIB) 1927, pp. 61–68)
The influence of both urbanization and transportation is in evidence in
the shift in American Bankers Association discourse on branch banking
between 1916 and 1930. Tied explicitly to modernization, the shift occurred
during debate over the course of three meetings. In 1916, ABA’s Federal
Legislation Committee, wanting to understand association members’ posi-
tions on branching as a way to resolve ambiguity about the relative strength
of the opposing logics, brought the topic to the floor of a meeting, prompting
extensive debate (nine pages of typed dialog) and resulting in a resolution
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stating the trade association’s opposition to branching. A second formal
resolution, passed in 1923, reiterated this position. In 1930, however, the ABA
issued the following revised resolution, tying changes in branching policy
directly to modernization pressures.
Modern transportation and other economic changes, both in large centers and county
districts, make necessary some readjustment of banking facilities. In view of these facts
this Association, while reaffirming its belief in the unit bank, recognizes that a
modification of its former resolutions condemning branch banking in any form is
advisable. The Association believes in the economic desirability of community-wide
branch banking in metropolitan areas and county-wide branch banking in rural districts.
(American Bankers Association, 1930, pp. 134–135)
One might anticipate that, as urbanization increased and the transportation
infrastructure improved, the potential of branching would be recognized by
growing numbers of banks and generate greater support for establishing
branches where they were not yet permitted. Prior work in economic history
has suggested such a relationship. Abrams and Settle’s (1993) study of
changes in branching laws during the Great Depression, for example, links
increasing urbanization to the relaxation of branching laws, and Calomiris
(1993) describes how during the 1930s banks in ‘‘limited banking’’ states
established city branch networks that increased their power, and then lobbied
for full state-wide branching. This prior work on the growth of branching
suggests that the logic of organizing among banks shifted as states urbanized
and connected to suburban areas, resulting in bank associations lobbying
legislatures to liberalize banking regulations. An interaction effect between
the strength of the respective logics in terms of the composition of banks and
modernization is likely inasmuch as the idea of branching, even as it was
gaining acceptance in banks, was likely also gaining acceptance in broader
society. Lobbying from multibranch banks over state legislatures was likely to
be more effective leading to more liberal branching legislation in states that
were experiencing modernizing trends where multibranch banks were
proportionally in greater representation.
Hypothesis 3a. States that are more highly urbanized are more likely to
pass liberal branching legislation.
Hypothesis 3b. The effect of urbanization is heightened in the presence of
relatively greater numbers of actors with a national-oriented banking
logic (i.e., multi-unit banks).
Hypothesis 4a. States with a more developed nonurban transportation
infrastructure are more likely to pass liberal branching legislation.
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Hypothesis 4b. The effect of the development of transportation is
heightened in the presence of relatively greater numbers of actors with
a nationally oriented banking logic (i.e., multi-unit banks).
METHODS AND ANALYSES
Sample and Dependent Variables
To test these hypotheses, we examine annual state-level banking laws for all
contiguous US states from 1896 through 1978. As noted, there is substantial
evidence that the branching debate began around the turn of the twentieth
century and 1896 is the date when the federal government began systematic
collection of state-level banking information. We terminate our analysis in
1978 mainly because legal changes enacted that year that permitted banks to
engage in interstate banking would confound these analyses that treat each
state as a separate institutional environment. Further, some of our predictions
relate to modernization, and as time progresses, differences between sates in
modernization becomes increasingly meaningless. The annual state-level data
yields 3,941 state-year observations (48 observations for each year, except
years that predate Oklahoma statehood in 1907 and NewMexico and Arizona
statehood in 1912). We created for each of the 48 contiguous states in the
sample from 1896 to 1978 annual state-level legal environment and regulatory
histories. Lacking a pre-existing list of these for each state, we examined
more than 15 secondary sources as well as, in many cases, actual state
statutes.4 Regulations were divided into four categories from most liberal to
most restrictive: full state-wide banking (i.e., no geographic restrictions on
locations); full state-wide banking, but only by merger, (i.e., banks could
expand only through acquisition, not by establishing branches); limited state-
wide banking (banks were permitted to establish branches within geographic
restrictions); unit banking (banks were limited to a single location).5 There
were 41 regulatory changes from more restrictive laws to more liberal laws
between 1896 and 1978, representing our dependent variable.
Independent Variables
To assess the relative influence of actors espousing different institutional
logics during institutional changes in a given state, we simply relied on the
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presence of two types of banks (i.e., multi-unit banks vs. unit banks) and
adopted the simple measure of the percentage of multi-unit banks (or
conversely unit banks). The data used to construct this measure was from
the Federal Reserve’s counts of banks and branches published annually
from 1929 to 1992 as well as a number of historical compilations that extend
back to the late nineteenth century. A number of years between 1896 and
1929 are linearly interpolated.6
To account for the effects of the Depression, we included an indicator
variable for the years between 1929 and 1935. To assess modernizing forces
in the environment represented by urbanization, we measured the total
population that lived in urbanized areas (logged). Although some of the
qualitative data presented earlier suggested that it was suburbanization
processes, not urbanization per se, that might have contributed to growth,
the fine-grained data on spatial distribution of the population needed to
assess this is not available for the period studied. The data were obtained
from the US Census Bureau at 10-year intervals beginning in 1890 and
interpolated in between. As a measure of transportation infrastructure, we
used roadway expansion beyond centralized population areas. This measure
has the benefit that it also captures suburbanization processes. We obtained
state data on nonurban highway mileage from the U.S. Department of
Transportation’s annually published Highway Statistics. To correct for size
of a state, we divided these values by the total land area in square miles of
the state. These data become available at the state level in 1923, so to
analyze the entire historical period, we extrapolated the series back to 1896
using data on total highways.7 Given that the outlying highway system did
not grow significantly until after 1923, this extrapolation should not bias the
analyses, and results are consistent when the extrapolated data are excluded
from the analysis. To address the degree to which banks in other states
influence a focal state’s actors and legislation, using the data sources
described earlier, we include the total of unit banks that are in the focal
state’s census region.
Control Variables
Prior studies have found that strength of supportive organizations can affect
policy decisions at state, local, and national levels (Cress & Snow, 2000;
Ingram & Rao, 2004). For example, Ingram and Rao (2004) find the number
of retail employees in a state, presumed to be allies of the chain store
movement, to be negatively related to the state passing an antichain law.
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Large manufacturing firms desirous of a more convenient and stable banking
system were a potentially important constituent in the branch banking debate
(Calomiris, 1993). In states in which manufacturing was expanding, those
firms likely pushed for laws that enabled the concomitant growth of banks
through branching. The power of manufacturing was gauged by the percent
of the population that worked in manufacturing calculated from data
collected from Historical Statistics of the States of the United States (Dodd,
1993) and the Census Bureau. Farming and small town interests, on the other
hand, hopeful that their local banks would continue to supply credit during
economic downturns, opposed branching (Roe, 1994). Data used to measure
the number of farms in a state (logged) were drawn from the US Agriculture
Department’s historical database on farms. Because this data exists only back
to 1910, values for the period before that were linearly extrapolated (using the
‘‘epolate’’ command in STATA). Further, to gauge the possibility that it is
not multi-unit firms, but larger firms that would be desirous of changing the
laws; we include a control for the average size of banks in a state, measured as
total average deposits.
Prior research has also shown that lawmaker preferences can make it
easier for a given group to influence the nature of legislation that is passed
(Burstein & Linton, 2002; Soule & Olzak, 2004). For example, Democrats are
usually presumed to be liberal and favor policies oriented toward overall social
welfare (Burstein & Linton, 2002; Huber, Ragin, & Stephens, 1993),
Republicans to be more conservative (Soule & Olzak, 2004), and supportive
of policies that favor corporate interests (Garrett, Wagner, & Wheelock, 2003;
Kroszner & Strahan, 1999). Lawmaker effects were captured by determining
(from ICPSR databases) whether a state’s governor was Republican. We also
include as control variables per capita income (measured using data from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis and, prior to 1929, from Population
Redistribution and Economic Growth, 1870–1950 (Lee, Miller, Brainerd, &
Easterlin, 1957)), and total state population (measured using data from the US
Census Bureau). We also included a linear time trend variable and, to account
for repeated events in the study, a variable for whether a state had previously
implemented a similar law.
Models
Our use of discrete time event history analysis to analyze these panel data
with a dichotomous dependent variable (Allison, 1995) is consistent with
empirical strategies employed by others who have investigated similar
processes (e.g., Schneiberg & Bartley, 2001; Soule & Olzak, 2004). As
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Yamaguchi (1991) and these authors have noted, discrete time models are
appropriate for such data because the event of interest can occur only at
regular, discrete time points (years) and state-level covariates are measured
in yearly increments.
A few differences between our analyses and what has been done before
also warrant mention. Although establishing within-group robust standard
errors was appropriate given the shorter time span of Soule and Olzak’s
(2004) study, because of our longer time period we have more observations
per group than groups (see the methodological appendix in Mizruchi &
Stearns, 2001 for a discussion). For our data, random effects, used in the
reported logit models, are a better way to account for multiple observations
per state. Also, our right censoring rule differs from those used in prior
investigations. In studies that deal with the passage of one type of law, when
the law is passed the state is censored. But in our study, states can make
multiple changes and are not censored until they reach the extreme ends of
the regulatory continuum (statewide and unit). The populations ‘‘at risk’’
for these analyses thus include all states in a given year that have not yet
become statewide or unit banking states. Because of censored values,
our analyses are conducted on a dataset of 2,779 state-year observations.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and correlations.
RESULTS
Table 2 presents the models that test the foregoing hypotheses. Model 1
includes the control variables. Results obtained with some of the control
variables are also of interest. Although not fully significant at the 0.05 level
in all analyses, the existence of allies (Ingram & Rao, 2004) appears to be an
important factor in this context; the percentage manufacturing employment
was a marginally significant influence on the liberalization of laws. Farmers
also appear to have had a countervailing force on the liberalization of laws.
Given that these actors also shared the underlying positions of the respective
banks, these findings are further evidence that the division between
community- and nationally oriented logics runs deep in the United States.
Model 2 tests Hypothesis 1. As might be expected, and consistent with
Hypothesis 1 in model 2, the percentage of banks with branches is a
significant predictor of a state’s passing a more liberal branching law,
suggesting that the prevalence of actors that support the nationally oriented
logic influences the passage of laws. Model 3 tests Hypothesis 2a by
including the dummy variable that captures the Great Depression. As would
Explaining the Loss of Community 197
Do
wn
loa
de
d b
y C
orn
ell
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
 A
t 1
9:2
7 0
1 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
6 (
PT
)
T
ab
le
1.
D
es
cr
ip
ti
ve
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
an
d
C
o
rr
el
at
io
n
s
fo
r
A
n
al
ys
es
o
f
L
ib
er
al
L
eg
al
C
h
an
ge
s.
M
ea
n
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
D
ev
ia
ti
o
n
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
1
L
ib
er
al
ch
an
ge
0.
02
4
0.
15
5
2
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
m
u
lt
i-
u
n
it
B
an
k
s
0.
11
3
0.
21
3
0.
13
9
3
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
em
p
lo
ym
en
t
in
m
an
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
0.
07
3
0.
04
9
0.
01
1
0.
20
8
4
N
u
m
b
er
fa
rm
s
(l
o
g)
11
.3
53
1.
05
9
!0
.0
66
!0
.2
54
!0
.1
16
5
In
co
m
e/
ca
p
it
a
9.
01
6
0.
54
7
0.
06
4
0.
53
9
0.
35
4
!0
.3
45
6
B
an
k
d
ep
o
si
ts
/
ca
p
it
a
5.
33
8
3.
98
7
0.
08
2
0.
48
2
0.
38
4
!0
.1
80
0.
80
0
7
U
rb
an
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
(l
o
g)
13
.6
9
1.
42
2
0.
02
7
0.
36
9
0.
52
9
0.
40
7
0.
47
3
0.
56
3
8
U
rb
an
!
%
m
u
lt
i-
u
n
it
b
an
k
s
1.
65
2
3.
21
3
0.
13
5
0.
99
7
0.
22
0
!0
.2
45
0.
54
0
0.
49
5
0.
38
8
9
N
o
n
u
rb
an
ro
ad
w
ay
s/
M
il
e2
0.
17
1
0.
26
5
0.
03
5
0.
17
5
0.
14
1
0.
02
2
0.
23
7
0.
22
0
0.
29
3
0.
17
6
10
R
o
ad
w
ay
s!
%
M
u
lt
i-
u
n
it
B
an
k
s
0.
02
9
0.
07
1
0.
15
2
0.
72
5
0.
18
8
!0
.1
36
0.
44
4
0.
40
1
0.
33
6
0.
72
7
0.
44
4
11
D
ep
re
ss
io
n
!
%
M
u
lt
i-
u
n
it
b
an
k
s
0.
00
3
0.
01
8
0.
06
9
!0
.0
04
0.
04
3
0.
02
9
!0
.1
46
!0
.0
21
0.
04
2
!0
.0
08
0.
03
1
!0
.0
09
12
R
ep
u
b
li
ca
n
go
ve
rn
o
r
0.
46
1
0.
49
9
!0
.0
34
!0
.0
41
0.
23
6
!0
.1
45
0.
07
7
0.
09
9
!0
.0
32
!0
.0
31
!0
.1
11
!0
.0
66
!0
.0
84
13
T
im
e
41
.5
7
23
.9
5
0.
11
4
0.
59
0
0.
05
8
!0
.1
22
0.
73
1
0.
65
9
0.
45
5
0.
58
0
0.
35
9
0.
49
5
!0
.0
31
!0
.1
72
14
#
P
ri
o
r
li
b
er
al
ch
an
ge
s
0.
36
2
0.
49
5
0.
02
5
0.
54
7
0.
19
3
!0
.0
18
0.
35
2
0.
35
0
0.
37
0
0.
53
7
0.
21
4
0.
45
2
0.
09
9
!0
.1
24
0.
48
6
15
D
ep
re
ss
io
n
(0
/1
)
0.
09
4
0.
29
2
0.
09
2
!0
.1
22
!0
.0
62
0.
05
7
!0
.3
24
!0
.1
45
!0
.0
33
!0
.1
20
0.
00
3
!0
.1
00
0.
53
1
!0
.1
13
!0
.0
63
!0
.0
34
CHRISTOPHER MARQUIS ET AL.198
Downloaded by Cornell University Library At 19:27 01 November 2016 (PT)
T
ab
le
2.
R
an
d
o
m
E
ff
ec
ts
L
o
gi
t
M
o
d
el
s
o
f
L
ib
er
al
iz
at
io
n
o
f
S
ta
te
B
ra
n
ch
in
g
L
aw
s.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
H
1
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
m
u
lt
i-
u
n
it
B
an
k
s
2.
24
!!
1.
80
!!
2.
35
!!
2.
19
!!
2.
58
!!
11
.5
5
þ
0.
60
(0
.7
5)
(0
.6
5)
(0
.8
2)
(0
.7
5)
(0
.9
7)
(6
.5
2)
(1
.1
3)
H
2a
D
ep
re
ss
io
n
(0
/1
)
1.
55
!!
1.
11
þ
1.
58
!!
1.
44
!!
(0
.4
7)
(0
.5
9)
(0
.4
8)
(0
.5
2)
H
3a
U
rb
an
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
(l
o
g)
!0
.1
1
!0
.1
8
!0
.1
0
!0
.1
6
(0
.3
1)
(0
.4
3)
(0
.2
5)
(0
.3
8)
H
4a
N
o
n
u
rb
an
ro
ad
w
ay
s/
M
il
e2
!0
.5
2
!1
.1
0
!0
.0
3
!2
.1
6!
(0
.7
2)
(0
.8
2)
(0
.6
4)
(0
.9
6)
H
2b
D
ep
re
ss
io
n
!
%
m
u
lt
i-
u
n
it
b
an
k
s
14
.3
2!
(6
.7
7)
H
3b
U
rb
an
!
%
m
u
lt
i-
u
n
it
b
an
k
s
!0
.6
2
(0
.4
2)
H
4b
R
o
ad
w
ay
s
!
%
m
u
lt
i-
u
n
it
b
an
k
s
6.
75
!!
(2
.5
7)
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
em
p
lo
ym
en
t
in
m
an
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
9.
45
þ
8.
28
5.
23
9.
31
9.
17
þ
11
.5
4
6.
71
10
.8
1þ
(4
.8
6)
(5
.4
0)
(4
.4
8)
(6
.0
6)
(5
.5
3)
(7
.6
9)
(5
.2
1)
(6
.4
2)
N
u
m
b
er
fa
rm
s
(l
o
g)
!0
.8
5!
!
!0
.7
3!
!
!0
.4
4!
!0
.6
5!
!0
.7
3!
!
!0
.8
6
!0
.2
9
!0
.6
3
(0
.1
8)
(0
.2
1)
(0
.1
8)
(0
.3
0)
(0
.2
2)
(0
.5
4)
(0
.2
5)
(0
.4
0)
In
co
m
e/
ca
p
it
a
!3
.3
8!
!
!3
.3
9!
!
!1
.5
5!
!3
.3
5!
!
!3
.4
2!
!
!2
.1
8!
!1
.5
7!
!2
.1
2!
(0
.6
4)
(0
.6
6)
(0
.7
4)
(0
.6
6)
(0
.6
6)
(0
.9
5)
(0
.7
9)
(0
.8
9)
B
an
k
d
ep
o
si
ts
/c
ap
it
a
0.
12
!
0.
12
þ
0.
07
0.
12
þ
0.
11
0.
06
0.
11
þ
0.
06
(0
.0
6)
(0
.0
7)
(0
.0
5)
(0
.0
7)
(0
.0
7)
(0
.0
8)
(0
.0
6)
(0
.0
8)
Explaining the Loss of Community 199
Downloaded by Cornell University Library At 19:27 01 November 2016 (PT)
T
ab
le
2.
(C
on
ti
nu
ed
)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
R
ep
u
b
li
ca
n
go
ve
rn
o
r
!0
.3
3
!0
.3
5
!0
.3
1
!0
.3
6
!0
.3
6
!0
.2
1
!0
.2
9
!0
.3
0
(0
.3
0)
(0
.3
1)
(0
.2
9)
(0
.3
1)
(0
.3
1)
(0
.3
3)
(0
.3
0)
(0
.3
3)
T
im
e
0.
10
!!
0.
09
!!
0.
06
!!
0.
09
!!
0.
09
!!
0.
10
!!
0.
06
!!
0.
09
!!
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
3)
#
P
ri
o
r
li
b
er
al
ch
an
ge
s
!1
.2
4!
!
!1
.9
3!
!
!1
.2
3!
!
!1
.9
0!
!
!1
.9
2!
!
!3
.0
8!
!
!1
.3
4!
!
!2
.3
6!
!
(0
.4
1)
(0
.4
9)
(0
.4
1)
(0
.4
9)
(0
.4
9)
(0
.9
0)
(0
.4
2)
(0
.7
9)
C
o
n
st
an
t
30
.7
9!
!
29
.9
6!
!
11
.4
4
30
.1
4!
!
30
.0
8!
!
22
.5
2!
11
.3
3
19
.6
7!
(6
.1
3)
(6
.5
3)
(7
.1
8)
(6
.5
2)
(6
.4
7)
(9
.8
9)
(7
.2
6)
(9
.0
4)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
27
79
27
79
27
79
27
79
27
79
27
79
27
79
27
79
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
gr
o
u
p
s
(i
.e
.,
st
at
es
)
47
47
47
47
47
47
47
47
N
ot
es
:
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
;
tw
o
-t
ai
l
te
st
s;
!
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
t
at
5%
;
!!
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
t
at
1%
.
CHRISTOPHER MARQUIS ET AL.200
Downloaded by Cornell University Library At 19:27 01 November 2016 (PT)
be expected from Fig. 1, the estimated coefficient of the Depression dummy
is strongly significant with a positive sign, supporting Hypothesis 2a.
The tests of the hypotheses regarding modernizing influences on
the passage of liberal bank branching laws are not fully consistent with
our expectations. As shown in Models 4 and 5, neither the main effect of
urbanization or that of non-urban roadways was significant. Hence,
Hypotheses 3a and 4a were not supported. Model 6 tests Hypothesis 2b.
The estimated coefficient of the interaction term is positive and statistically
significant, strongly supporting the hypothesis that the presence of multi-
unit banks accentuates the Depression effect. Model 7 tests Hypothesis 3b.
The interaction between urbanization and the presence of multi-unit banks
is not significant, and Hypothesis 3b is not supported. But the interactive
effect of non-urban roadway infrastructure and the presence of multi-unit
banks as shown in model 8 was a significant determinant of whether a
state passed a more liberal branching law. This finding, which supports
Hypothesis 4b, suggests that perhaps it is transportation development and
associated suburbanization processes in combination with existence of
multi-unit banks that is the most important force relating to modernization
that leads to legal changes in the banking context.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter analyzed the process of historical change that resulted in the
US banking industry’s shift in dominant institutional logics. The dominant
logic at the turn of the twentieth century was that of community control and
single-unit operations. The appropriate geographic domain of US banks
was subsequently extensively contested, and significant variation developed
among US states in the degree to which branching was permitted. Over the
course of the twentieth century, the dominant institutional logic of
the industry shifted to that of nationally oriented banking. We examined
the processes under-girding this transition by an exploratory examination of
historical meeting minutes of bankers associations and also statistically
through event history analyses of when states passed more liberal bank
branching laws. Our main thesis is that institutional transitions are often the
combined result of endogenous processes on the one hand, whereby actors
with opposing logics compete with each other to gain dominance, and
exogenous changes on the other. This either creates opportunities for
competing actors to reshape the balance of power or attenuate competition
by inducing actors to change beliefs and identities.
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As expected, states in which a relatively greater number of the actors
supported a given logic were more likely to codify that logic into law.
Although the hypotheses regarding the main effects of exogenous changes
(i.e., the Great Depression and modernization) receive only mixed support,
such findings themselves are actually consistent with our contention that the
influence of exogenous changes on institutional changes is at least partly
contingent on how actors with different beliefs and identities react to such
changes. Our further analysis shows that the effect of the Great Depression
and the development of transportation highly depends on the relative
presence of strategic groups of actors. This finding suggests that these
external changes were not the punctuated and relatively unproblematic
events as portrayed in prior work. With these findings, we highlight some
implications of this study below.
Competing Logics and Organizational Identity
We witnessed through our historical study nearly a century of struggle and
debate over two competing logics that were central to US society and that
were extensively promoted by the organizations whose identities were
defined by those logics. Consistent with prior research, the logics of banks,
which were tied to their identities (Almandoz, 2010; Marquis & Lounsbury,
2007), were longstanding. But unlike prior research, our analysis shows that
these identities guided strategic action as bankers worked to convince
legislatures and the public that their logic was the most appropriate vision
for not only the banking sector but for society more generally. Identity and
interest combine as strategic actors mobilize politically to shape laws and
interpret historical events in agreement with the institutional logic embodied
in their organization’s identity. Thus, unlike research that shows how
institutional change happens as novel logics take hold among professionals
(Rao et al., 2003), or research that shows how differing organizational
identities passively coexist in a field (Lounsbury, 2001), we witness the
microdynamics of how organizations act strategically, guided by their
identities and interests, striving to change broader conceptions of what is
socially desirable and politically feasible, taking advantage of opportunities
presented to them by historical events.
We further suggest that one reason for the lengthy period of stability
during this contest of competing logics is that other features of external
environments provided varying degrees of support for the opposing groups’
identities. Our historical study suggests that modernizing environments had
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a priming effect on organizations by alerting them to the possible choices
and opportunities that might become available to them, and thereby
supporting the nationally oriented logic. Our statistical analyses confirm
that expansion of the non-urban transportation infrastructure in combina-
tion with the presence of multi-unit banks influenced changes in bank laws.
Although organizational identities are typically seen as quite durable, here
we find that some single unit actors were apparently willing to shift their
identities as the external environment changed. The historical meeting
minutes suggested that there is significant variance on this process as some
banks and bankers continually defend their position while others gradually
shifted identities as the new economic reality took hold.
Dominant Logic Transitions and Historical Periods
We conceptualize the process of historical change as an interactive model,
concluding that patterns of discontinuous change are not fully exogenous, but
that they are expedited by an endogenous component. Legal changes, typically
conceptualized as exogenous and often measured in terms of major federal
legislative acts that clearly define historical periods (Davis et al., 1994; Scott
et al., 2000), are among the most frequent markers of transitions in dominant
logics and consequent transformations of firm behavior. Returning again to
Fig. 1, we found a more complex pattern than would be suggested by the
graph that shows multiple stable eras punctuated by periods of rapid change,
suggesting that these were really culminations of periods of opposition over
the appropriate organizing logic for the industry. Although the quantitative
analysis may not fully reveal such processes, there is qualitative evidence. As
noted, in contrast to widely accepted accounts that it was the disproportionate
failure of unit banks that contributed to the economic crises and that
branching laws were a solution, unit bankers maintained that the Depression
era legislative changes resulted from the political work of multi-unit bankers.
The unit bankers contention is supported by recent economic history that finds
that multi-unit banks were just as susceptible to failure as were unit banks
(Carlson &Mitchener, 2005), suggesting that the changes were more a result of
multi-unit bankers successfully framing the issue (Benford & Snow, 2000) than
of the economic reality at the time.
The historical meeting minutes suggest further that large exogenous
shocks occurred frequently, particularly in the first half of the twentieth
century. For example, in addition to 1929, there were major economic crises
in 1896, 1901, and 1907. Other major events that impacted the economy and
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are frequently seen as demarcating periods include two world wars and
significant federal changes or debate that influenced branching legislation in
1927 (the McFadden Act), 1937 (the McAdoo Act for national branching
which was extensively debated, but not passed), and 1955 (the Bank Holding
Company Act). Interestingly, there is evidence that some of these shocks had
localized effects on state branching laws, which were connected to the
presence of strategic actors. The branch banking law enacted in California in
1909, for example, was widely agreed to be a response to the panic of 1907
(California State Bankers Association, 1909, pp. 78–130) combined with the
institutional entrepreneurship of Bank of America founder A. P. Giannini
(James & James, 1954), and Georgia’s decision to restrict its banking law in
1927 to have resulted from the failure of a branch bank system the year before
and the passage of the McFadden Act (National Association of Supervisors
of State Banks, 1937). Our point is that there is no shortage of major social,
economic, and political shocks during historical eras. But, as the series of
interaction effects we present shows, to understand which shock precipitates a
change in the dominant logic one needs to consider as well endogenous
factors and, in particular, strategic features of politically oriented actors. This
suggests a somewhat counterintuitive conclusion that endogenous features
must be present for discontinuous change to occur. Although it is typically
assumed that the existence of discontinuous change is prima facie evidence of
dramatic exogenous change, these results combined with our exploratory
historical analyses suggest somewhat the opposite. Frequent shocks and
transitions occur when strategic actors are able to capitalize on shocks. The
effects of other, more gradual exogenous change processes are also shown to
be better understood as interactions between exogenous and endogenous
forces. Although others have found modernization to be a primary driver of
changes in the structure of thrifts in California (Haveman & Rao, 1997),
looking across all US states, we find modernizing forces to have an effect only
when the requisite strategic actors are relatively more powerful.
The view of organizations as logic-infused strategic actors working not
only to sell deposit and loan accounts, but also to recast the field to be
consistent with their worldview and identity, suggests that the effects of
identity and logics-oriented movements might be more pervasive than
previously thought. The control variables used in the study provide some
suggestion that farmers, and manufacturers as well, might have been active
participants in advocating the community and national logics, respectively.
Recent research has shown similarly that the logic of banks is influenced by
other organizations in the environment such as volunteer organizations, and
other financial institutions (Almandoz, 2010). Although prior work has
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suggested that similar identity-related strategic action is operant in the
sphere of cultural consumption (Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000; Rao et al.,
2003), as we have shown here, community versus national orientations in
organizations can also be seen as a battleground for identity-related cultural
and political contestation.
We further emphasize however that the contestation between the
community logic and the national logic is not unique to the banking
industry but widespread in many other industries and domains in the US
society (e.g., Ingram & Rao, 2004). Additionally, although our analyses may
suggest otherwise, we recognize this struggle is still alive. Although by some
measures such as state banking laws, the national logic clearly appears to
have replaced the community logic, by others however, such as new bank
foundings, the community logic appears to live on (Almandoz, 2010;
Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007; see also Marquis & Battilana, 2009). Thus, the
values, beliefs, and motives created by this logic are still present in US
society and can potentially be reactivated when opportunities arise. For
example, in addition to the recent increase in community bank foundings,
there has been significant recent resistance against the invasion of gigantic
corporations like Wal-Mart into local communities (Ingram, Yue, & Rao,
2010). We believe that this recent revival of the community logic is quite
consistent with our theory; as long as there are believers of the community
logic, exogenous changes may provide opportunities for these actors to
reassert the merits of the community logic. Many, for example, have
commented that financial crisis of 2008 could well be one of those exogenous
shocks similar to the Great Depression that could reconfigure the balance of
logics, but this time in favor of the community logic. For their active role in
the crisis, Wall Street banks and other ‘‘too-big-to-fail’’ financial institutions
have been denigrated as icons of greed. In settings where bank customers
and regulators receive those arguments favorably, one could expect a
resurgence of the community logic (Almandoz, 2010). Against the backdrop
of our study, this suggests that seemingly long dead logics may just remain
dormant and look for opportunities to regain life in one way or another, and
such opportunities are often created by large-scale exogenous changes which
allow advocates to launch a forceful attack on the dominant logic.
NOTES
1. Bankers were tied to trade associations for many reasons, not only the
aforementioned broader issues such as burglary and insurance, but also many areas
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of common ground such as expansion of bank holidays. There were also issues of
maintaining the trust of peer institutions and of identity relating to their profession
as bankers and connection with their states (Haveman & Cohen, 1994). Trade
association membership was broad and, because of the extensive access of these
groups, the debate between groups of banks intent on pressing for the endorsement
of their respective organizing logics played out within the associations. This suggests
that the actors responsible for strategically framing the respective logics are
important variables in understanding which would come to dominate.
2. New Jersey association minutes, for example, frequently recount members’ letter
writing efforts and time spent in Trenton and delivering briefs to legislature members.
The amount of activity was staggering. Meeting minutes record that in New York
alone, ‘‘[c]irculars, bulletins and letters have been sent on an average of three a month,
or more than 40,000 mailings. Including letters, more than 45,000 pieces of mail have
been issued from the office. We have had more than 3,600 outgoing telephone calls and
125 outgoing telegrams’’ (New York State Bankers Association, 1932, p. 16). It is
clear, moreover, that the influence of these state and national banker associations
derived from their frequent and direct access to the lawmaking apparatus and the fact
that they represented a consolidated voice for state bankers. Although examples
abound of direct contact between bankers representing trade associations and
legislators, the indirect influence of these organizations is perhaps even more telling.
For example, in almost every year studied, the governors of the given states addressed
the annual bankers meetings and were involved in other convention events such as
dinners, and national-level leaders such as sitting and former secretaries of Commerce
and Treasury, Federal Reserve Board members, and other notable policy makers
frequently attended various state bankers meetings.
3. Only recently have economic historians challenged this conventional wisdom
and come to realize that branch banks were just as susceptible to failure in the
depression as single unit banks (Carlson & Mitchener, 2005).
4. A survey by the Comptroller of the Currency reported in Chapman and
Westerfield (1942) contains information on branching regulations in 1896. We used
this survey, cited by a number of sources as the first survey of branch banking in the
United States, as my starting point in compiling histories of bank laws. Fischer (1968),
referencing the Comptroller of the Currency and National Monetary Commission,
details regulatory changes between 1896 and 1909. For this early period, we also
examined the ‘‘Digest of State Banking Statutes’’ compiled by the National Monetary
Commission. Bradford’s (1940) The Legal Status of Branching in the United States
contains information assembled from a periodic publication of the Federal Reserve for
the years 1910, 1924, 1929, 1932, 1936, and 1939. We also examined the Federal
Reserve publication ‘‘State Laws Relating to Branch Banking’’ (Federal Reserve
Bulletin, March 1925; April 1930; July 1932; November 1936; October 1939; July 1951
contains the text of the state statutes). Fischer’s (1968, pp. 62–63) state-by-state
breakdown of intrastate banking and regulations between 1924 and 1967 documents
the years of changes. The Federal Reserve’s monograph-length Compilation of Federal
and State Statutes Relating to Branch Banking, published in December 1956 and
October 1967, contains the statutes at those times. For the period after 1967, we use
the Conference of State Bank Supervisors’ A Profile of State-Chartered Banking
(various years), published bi-annually beginning in 1965. Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise
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(1995) have made a summary of laws since 1960, and Rhoades’s (1981) ‘‘Banking
Structure and Performance at the State Level During the 1970s’’ recounts the
regulations in effect during the 1970s. For some of the earlier years for which we had
to make assumptions about branching regulations, we relied on Fischer (1968), who
maintains that regulation during this period was in many cases by custom rather than
law. We followed his assessment of the type of branching enforced in a given state. For
the few cases for which we did not have branch law information for a particular year,
we assumed the legal history to be continuous (e.g., if we had information that Illinois
was a unit banking state in 1911 and 1915, we assumed it to have been a unit banking
state from 1912 to 1914).
5. Typically, branching regulations are categorized as unit, limited, and statewide;
we used a four-category system to better capture the frequency of changes during the
period.
6. Results are consistent when run without interpolated years.
7. To accomplish this, we used the percent change in total national highway
mileage (data for which exists back to 1900) for each year to determine how much
nonurban mileage increased each year. By 1900, the end of this data series, total
national mileage is reduced to 100. To obtain the 1896 to 1899 values, we linearly
interpolated for each state under the assumption that in 1896 there were 0 miles.
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APPENDIX: PROCESS OF EXAMINING THE STATE
BANKING CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
We examined the State Banking Conference Proceedings of 20 different states
and 4 separate National and Regional Banking Association Proceedings/
Conference Minutes. These include: Alabama (1927–1969); Arizona (1903/
1905–1930); California (1907–1940); Illinois (1917–1952); Kansas
(1911–1931); Louisiana (1914–1915); Maryland (1925–1945); Massachusetts
(1905–1978); Michigan (1899–1948); Missouri (1903–1951); New Jersey
(1906–1939); New Mexico (1916–1920); New York (1898–1941); Nebraska
(1903, 1915); North Dakota (1911, 1932–1933); Oregon (1931); Pennsylvania
(1896–1919); Texas (1925–1943); Washington (1902–1967/1968); Wisconsin
(1912–1924),: Proceedings of the Convention of the American Bankers
Association (1876–1939); National Association of Supervisors of State Banks
Convention (1902–1941); American Institute of Banking Proceedings of
Departmental Conferences (1924–1931); Pacific Northwest Conference on
Banking (1936–1960).
These materials represent a very unique collection of documents housed
at the Baker Library at Harvard Business School. Thus, the choice of these
particular meeting minutes was driven in some senses by convenience since
this is the only extant collection of such materials. In the majority of cases,
these meeting minutes were verbatim transcripts of what transpired at the
annual meetings, as recorded by stenographers. Not only were the scheduled
presentations recorded, but also question and answer sessions and other
business meetings of the association officials. The minutes were typically
bound in annual volumes of 300–400 typewritten pages. These volumes
appear to be mainly used internally, as a record for the associations and
affiliated bankers, although toward the end of the period, a few associations
appear to have distributed them more widely.
We approached the documents from an inductive standpoint. Over a
period of six months, we spent an average of 2–3 h a day reading these
volumes and taking notes. The volumes typically had a table of contents or
program from the meeting, which help me narrow our search for
information and debate on the branch banking issue. In some cases, these
volumes had indices which we used to further refine our search. After
identifying the relevant sections in each volume, we read them and marked
the relevant pages that we wanted to revisit. The library then photocopied
these pages for me, and we picked them up the next day. At which point, we
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read the photocopied pages again in more detail, making notes, and
highlighting in the text important quotes or passages. Our notes and
highlighted materials were then typed. The final document that includes all
states is a total of 87 single-spaced typewritten pages, including both the
quotes and our notes.
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